Nascent Liberalism in Antiquity and the Medieval Ages

This is part five from a forthcoming book called Collected Essays: Volume Two.

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 Nascent Liberalism in Antiquity and the Medieval Ages

Liberalism emerged in the 18^th century during the Enlightenment. Its first exponent was John Locke whose ideas gained traction in Great Britain after the Glorious Revolution. Although these ideas have been highly influential since then, earlier societies placed a lot more emphasis on community than the individual. Earlier societies espoused these views, but one of the main principles of liberalism was anti-authoritarianism and that tyrannical majorities should not enforce their dogmas on others. The purpose of this essay is to look at ancient Greece and Rome and the medieval ages. It will establish the what these societies believed in and, following this, will introduce thinkers from these eras. Although these thinkers might not be outright liberals, they do evince traces of ‘nascent liberalism.’ It will look at Cicero, Pericles, Diogenes and Marcus Aurelius for the section on antiquity and it will look at St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas for the section on the medieval ages.

Like all ideologies, ‘liberalism’ is a diffuse term. Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises called themselves liberals, but so did William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes. Some liberals support a welfare state whilst others call themselves ‘anarcho-capitalists’ and want no state involvement in the economy whatsoever. However, there are principles which all liberals espouse and this essay will start by identifying these principles. According to John Gray, liberalism is individualistic, egalitarian, melioristic and universal (1998). It is individualistic because it sees the individual as the prime unit of society and not as part of a collective. It is egalitarian because it believes in the equal worth of each individual, everyone should be treated equally and not be discriminated against. It is melioristic because it believes in progress and that things develop and change. It is universal because it believes that these principles are universal to everyone, regardless of their nationality or tribe. Additionally, liberals are neutral about the good life as long as no-one is harmed and do not prescribe a worldview to others. A liberal would go out of his way to defend a lifestyle that he disapproves of. Liberalism defends tolerance, human rights, civil liberties, democracy, a market economy, property rights, equality before the law, a free press and personal freedom. All in all, Hayek, Mises, Beveridge and Keynes, whilst they might be opposites in other ways, would all agree with these principles. However, classical liberals want to restrict the role of the state as much as possible. Meanwhile, ‘modern’ or ‘social’ liberalism grants a role for a role for the welfare state and believes that protecting individual liberty means promoting social justice. The poor, the disabled, the mentally ill and other disenfranchised groups do not have the opportunities to enjoy freedom. The market does not assist them adequately, so the state should step in to assist them.

            As the introduction recognised, earlier societies placed more emphasis on the community than the individual. However, Rene Descartes signalled a change with his book Meditations on First Philosophy, which was published in 1641. It includes the famous phrase ‘I think therefore I am’: ‘The proposition that “I am, I exist” is necessarily true whenever it is, stated by me or my own mind’ (1998, p. 24). Descartes continuously uses the first person singular ‘I’ throughout his treatise. He tries to be sceptical about everything about him and even doubts the existence of the world around him. He is only certain that his own mind exists and that God exists. This is because humans acquire everything through the senses, which are highly unreliable (p. 19). This kind of pure metaphysical speculation is radically sceptical of the material world and Descartes doubts if it exists. It is almost solipsistic, let alone idealistic, as it seems to be sceptical of the existence of other minds that are not his own. This kind of introspection is radically different from the rigid communitarianism of earlier centuries.

            However, Descartes’ Meditations was hardly an attempt to construct a liberal philosophy. Liberalism emerged in the late 17^th century with John Locke. Prior to the advent of liberalism, Europe had been engulfed in religious wars. The Thirty Years war was a conflict between Protestants and Catholics and it included Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Protestant German princes and Catholic France against the Habsurg Empire. (France joined the Protestants because they were worried about a Habsurg hegemony in Europe.) (Bonney 2011, p. 7). The war ravaged the economies of Europe and left a large death toll. Liberalism emerged at the end of this century and it celebrated tolerance of different religious creeds and beliefs. It emerged during the Glorious Revolution, when English peers were opposed to the Catholic policies of King James II. They wrote to Prince William of Orange to intervene (Vallance 2006, p. 2). Once he settled, he created a document called ‘Declaration of Rights,’ which established parliamentary government (p. 3) and affirmed the illegality of the independent exercise of royal power (p. 176). The High Commission could not levy money without parliamentary consent and could not order the army without the consent of parliament (p. 176). It asserted the right of petitioning, the need for the free election of MPs, privileged freedom of speech and debate in parliament and the need for frequent parliaments (p. 176-77). Additionally, the government created the Toleration Act in the 1690s, which tolerated a plurality of religious beliefs and moved closer to the radical ideas of John Locke (p. 316).   

            John Locke laid the foundations for liberalism. Indeed, the European Enlightenment effectively starts with John Locke (Dunne 1984, p. 21). Locke wrote that religious freedom meant being religious in one’s own way – not, as the atheist James Toland would have it, to be completely indifferent to religion (Dunne, p. 17). The individual was free to worship God as he individually saw fit (p. 20). For Locke, each individual is responsible for his own actions and should not submit to an authoritarian sovereign. He thought that rulers should be restrained as much as possible (p. 20). Another early exponent of early Enlightenment values was Benedict de Spinoza who stated the following: ‘Each individual has the sovereign right to do all that he can’ (1951, p. 200). Spinoza emphasised the use of reason rather than emotion. He prescribed equality before the rule of law, but he also wanted to protect minorities and to stop the state from becoming tyrannical (p. 207). Crucially, he prioritised the needs of the individual over the needs of the community and this once more signals a shift away from the communitarian past: ‘Wrong is conceivable only in an organised community, nor can it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign who has the right to do what he likes’ (p. 208). For centuries, communities had oppressed the individual and forced him to submit to customs and traditions. Spinoza is saying here that the individual does not have to submit to the customs of the majority. He is entitled to lead his life as he individually sees fit and can use his reason to pursue his life projects. This is one of the reasons why the Enlightenment was so revolutionary, as it rejected the values which had been prevalent for centuries.

            Having examined the origins of liberalism, this essay will examine ‘nascent’ liberalism in ancient antiquity and the medieval ages. It will start by outlining what societies were like in these times and, following this, will introduce thinkers who exhibit signs of ‘nascent liberalism.’ It will start by outlining the structure of society in Ancient Greece. Society in Ancient Greece was governed by strict norms. Society was not conceived as an association of individuals, it was conceived as an association of families (Siedentop 2014, p. 7). The father was a God in preparation, the wife was subordinated to the husband and the authority of the father meant that he could kill his wife or children if he wanted to (Siedentop, p. 15). He exercised his authority ‘on the basis of beliefs shared by the family’ (Siedentop, p. 15). All the members of the family were descended from a common ancestor and bound together by blood (Bury 1920, p. 53). The family owned a plot of land where their ancestors were buried and the family worshiped their ancestors on a continual basis. This was done so as to prevent the ancestors from ‘being cast into oblivion’ (Siedentop, p. 15). Each family buried the dead in their own domain and one of the highest duties was to protect the tombs of the fathers (Bury, p. 54). Property belonged to the family, not to any particular individual (Siedentop, p. 16). The Greeks and the Romans, unlike us, made no distinction between private and public spheres, they made a distinction between public and domestic spheres. The domestic sphere was the sphere of the family, not of individuals endowed with rights. It was also very unequal in terms of roles, as women and slaves had no rights (Siedentop, p. 18). Several families would group themselves together into a society called ‘phatra,’ a brotherhood. Indeed, Homer said that he who has no brothers has no hearth (Bury, p. 54). Prior to the advent of the city, and a more sophisticated political and legal structure, the families were led by a king. He was the chief priest and war-lord of the tribe (Bury, p. 54). The king pronounced judgements, dealt with justice and led the hosts to war (p. 55). He was a protecting deity and he was revered as a God (p. 58). This confederation of families gradually became a city, however ancient citizenship left no space for individual choice (Siedentop, p. 21). Strict rules permeated dress, deportment, marriage, sport, education and conversation. If an individual deviated from them, he would be deported (Siedentop, p. 22). The welfare of the city was considered more important than the rights of the individual. Patriotism was the highest virtue for the Greeks and someone who retreated from patriotism and the ideal of the city was an ‘idiot’ (Siedentop, p. 25). Indeed, Aristotle went as far as saying that the life of the citizen was the only life worth living (Siedentop, p. 25). Each city had its own God, but Greeks from different cities did not mingle with each other. There was no notion of individual rights and there was no liberty of thought or action. Participation in the assembly and the magistrate was obligatory and enforced for citizens (Siedentop, p. 28). People were born into casts and this inequality was considered natural (Siedentop, p. 51). The citizens were a small minority, but women, slaves and plebs were barred from participating in the political process. Indeed, these strict social roles were stifling and any slight deviation from them was punished. One of the most famous examples of this was Socrates, who was chastised for ‘corrupting the youth of Athens.’

            Having established what society was like in Ancient Greece, this essay will look at four figures from Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome and will attempt to detect traces of ‘nascent liberalism.’ It will start by looking at Cicero whose ideas on property closely resemble classical liberalism. In Ancient Greece and Rome, property belonged to the family so that they could worship their ancestors (Siedentop, p. 16). Plato says the following in Laws: ‘Thou who art only a pilgrim here below does it belong to thee to decide such affairs? Thou art the master neither of thy property nor of thyself, thou and thy estate, all these things belong to thy family; that is to say, to thy ancestors and to thy posterity (Siedentop, p. 17). Interfering with property meant interfering with the family and domestic religion (p. 17). However, Cicero argued in favour of property rights and argued that property should belong to individuals. Justice for Cicero meant respecting property and taking property away from someone is the gravest violation. He also opposed state-mandated redistribution, since he argued that if you had the right to something, you should not take it away from them (Nussbaum 2019, p. 55). The taking of private property, for Cicero, was a grave injustice, as it violated ‘the law of fellowship’ (Nussbaum, p. 25). Alternatively, the Stoics at the time argued that property should be commonly owned (p. 56). In other words, they were prototypical socialists. Cicero argued that taking property rights away from someone means using someone as a tool for someone’s convenience (p. 27). This is very similar to Immanuel Kant’s views on ethics, as he argued that individuals are ends in themselves and should be able to determine their own actions. Individuals are ends in themselves and should not be used as means by others to satisfy a pattern. Indeed, Cicero was a big influence on Kant (Nussbaum, p. 28). The first liberal thinker, John Locke, stressed the importance of property rights and it was one of the most important liberal tenets. Classical liberalism opposes the redistribution of wealth, but later ‘modern’ liberals do support a modest redistribution of wealth. Cicero’s arguments also mirror the ideas of 20^th century libertarian Robert Nozick. Nozick opposed the redistribution of wealth, as he argued that it uses individuals as means to specific ends. Nozick even sees personal taxation as an infringement on liberty. Despite this similarity to later liberal thinkers, Cicero held communitarian views. He championed the public life and he argued that true potential can only be realised in the community: ‘The primary reason for its coming together is not so much weakness as a sort of innate desire on the part of human beings to form communities. For our species is not made up of solitary individuals or lonely wanderers’ (year, p. 19). The emphasis is very much on the public sphere and on community, something that the Enlightenment and thinkers like Spinoza later questioned.

            This essay will now look at Pericles, Greece’s democratic leader. Initially, liberalism was sceptical of democracy, as thinkers like John Stuart Mill thought that it might lead to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and to ‘mob rule.’ Pericles also spoke about ‘the people,’ which might also seem illiberal as it speaks about an abstract entity that does not exist. Indeed, the founders of the United States were sceptical of Pericles as they thought that democracy meant ‘mob rule.’ However, liberalism and democracy have since been fused together and they are seen as complementary. Still, the alternative to democracy at the time was aristocracy, oligarchy, Plato’s ‘philosopher kings’ and despotism, which were more illiberal and concentrated power into small groups. Most Athenians lacked Pericles’ education, as they had a poor standard of living. Many members of the small elite that Pericles belonged to opposed democracy, as it meant sharing power with a mass of citizens who were less affluent. It also meant that they had to contribute financial resources so as to provide benefits for the masses (Martin 2016, p. 7). Pericles wanted to strengthen political and financial measures so as to support the majority of his citizens (p. 7). Pericles’ opponents blamed him for the decisions that male citizens made in the democratic assembly and for spending money on expensive public buildings (p. 7). After the Peloponnesian War, when Pericles himself was killed, there was a short period of dictatorship, which Socrates supported. Following the restoration of democracy, Socrates was trialled and killed. Indeed, Pericles and his democratic ideals were anathema to Socrates and Plato who were in favour of ‘philosopher kings.’ Their view of society, however, was more authoritarian. Plato wanted to destroy the family and subject all Athenians to a strict education system. Meanwhile, Pericles wanted to distribute power more widely, which makes him less authoritarian and, hence, more liberal. Pericles was completely committed to freedom (p. 143), the primary liberal value. He was also committed to equality, as he increased democracy. He tried to reduce the political and judicial powers of the Areopagus Council. The members were chosen randomly and juries were made up of hundreds of thousands of people who were chosen by lottery (p. 143). The Areopagus was made up of mandatory annual examinations of financial accounts of officials who held government posts. Former officials would not be determining the guilt or innocence of their colleagues in public office. This reform diminished corruption and made Athenian more egalitarian (p. 143). Of course, transparency and public accountability are liberal ideals, as liberals do not want public officials to abuse power. Laws were made by juries and they were chosen at random. Accountability was in control of the majority, not the social elite. It is disputable whether this was truly liberal, as fifth century Athens was ruled by the will of the majority and liberalism aims to protect minorities against the majority. Indeed, J.B. Bury argues that Pericles ‘ruled as a tyrant’ and that ‘subjects must obey his nod’ (p. 382). However, Pericles was primarily interested in extending freedom to everyone and he was committed to the liberal values of freedom, equality and universalism.

            This essay will now look at Diogenes, whose strange behaviour disconcerted the Greeks. The Polis in Ancient Greece has strict social rules, but Diogenes deviated from that. He did not write tracts, instead he was a philosopher-as-performance-artist. Unlike Socrates, who engaged in dialogue but did not write, Diogenes enacted eccentric theatrics which drew attention to himself. A lot of his act was about authenticity in an age when deviation from norms would brand you an ‘idiot.’ For Diogenes, to become a true individual and a proper human being, one had to reject conventional society and its values. Otherwise, one would simply be a member of a crowd (Hard 2002, p. ix). Whilst this is something that a moody teenager might espouse these days, it was a radical statement in Ancient Greece. In an age of strict social rules, he masturbated in public, wandered around the streets with a lantern in broad daylight asking ‘for an honest man,’ slept in a wooden jar, he was always surrounded by dogs and he went up to one of Plato’s lectures and threw a plucked chicken at him. This was all part of his philosophy, which aimed to disrupt the stultifying staidness of Athenian culture. He did everything in public in a society with strict public norms. He often walked against the flow of the crowd, as he said that people should be ashamed for their wrong direction in life (p. ix). The mass of people, for Diogenes, are anonymous. Members of a crowd are slave and scum (p. ix). He rejected conventionality because he wanted individuals to discover their true nature (p. ix). In a highly permissive age, this might seem like a cliché, but in a society in which only the public realm existed, when there was no private realm, with strict rules on dress, behaviour and comportment, this was radical behaviour.

            Finally, this essay will briefly consider Marcus Aurelius, a Roman emperor. Like Cicero, Aurelius was a Roman stateman and he was deeply involved in its politics. For the most part, like Cicero, Aurelius mainly speaks about community and the common good. He says the following in Meditations: ‘We are born for community’ (2016, p. 41). Indeed, he also says:

Just as you yourself are a complementary part of a social system, so too your every action should complement a life of social principle. If an action of yours, then, does not have direct or indirect relation to the social end, it pulls your life apart and destroys its unity. It is a kind of sedition, like an individual in a democracy unilaterally resigning from common harmony (p. 88).

It is considered ‘sedition’ to do things that have no social end and every action should ‘complement a social principle.’ What would have he have made of Diogenes’ behaviour? However, Aurelius expresses a more liberal philosophy with the following statement: ‘The idea of a polity administered with regard to equal rights, and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed’ (p. 5). Indeed, this leans closer to the kind of philosophy espoused by Spinoza and Locke who thought that the primary aim of governments is to protect the freedom of its citizens. He also wants to protect freedom of speech and he says that all citizens are endowed with equal rights. It is a lot less communitarian and authoritarian than his other statements and it evinces a prototypical liberalism.

            This essay will now look at the medieval period. In the early medieval period, all members of society were part of a clan. They were monogamous and adultery was rare (Thompson and Johnson 1937, p. 69). All members of the clan were liable for an offence committed by just one of its members, including murder (p. 73). Woods, pasture and the waste land were owned by the community, but farm land was owned by individuals (p. 74). Agriculture was a co-operative enterprise (p. 74). Kings were chosen on account of their ancestry and their valour (p. 74). Society in the medieval ages was made up of rigid social classes and each had its own function (p. 74). The first estate was the clergy, the second estate was the nobility and the third was labour. Feudalism was the system which regulated relationships among members of the third estate (p. 309). Freedom of the individual was confined only to aristocracy and there was little individualism in feudal times (p. 311). Like ancient times, community rather the individual was the primary value. Property was commonly owned, but society was strictly stratified and several sections of society lacked rights.

            Indeed, this system was known as ‘feudalism’ and the section in society with fewest rights were called ‘serfs.’ Serfdom was revoked in the 15^th century, which was a big change (Wickham 2006, p. 15), but prior to this serfs could scarcely be differentiated from slaves (p. 329). A serf could not own property (p. 329) and was often sold like a slave, often for less than the price of a horse (p. 329). A serf could appear in court against another serf, but not against a freeman or a lord (p. 329). Serfs always stayed on the same land, even if it was sold, but they were at least protected from unemployment (p. 330). Societies in the medieval ages were more tribal, there was little freedom of the individual and society was stratified. There were no universal human rights, a common value of the liberal Enlightenment, and large sections of society did not have the same rights as others. In ancient times, only citizens had rights and could participate in public affairs, but even there was still no much lee-way for independent thought. They still had to respect customs and gods. At least some of the aristocracy had more freedom in medieval times.

            However, several of the ‘fathers’ in the medieval ages spoke a lot more about free will and autonomy than the ancients did. Indeed, Larry Siedentop argues in Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Modern Liberalism (2014) that Christianity was an individualistic religion. St. Paul conceived of a religion in which the individual finds salvation through Christ. St. Augustine (354-430) developed St. Paul’s philosophy further. He spoke about ‘the will’ and pride of the intellect meant that the human being can determine his own choices (Siedentop 2014, p. 102). St. Augustine, unlike the ancients, did not believe that some people in society were inherently better than others. He believed that all souls were equal (p. 102), which conforms to the egalitarian principle of liberalism, as liberalism argues that all individuals are of equal worth. Souls, according to Augustine, are not inherently superior to one another (p. 102), which rejects the natural inequality of Ancient Greece and Rome. Ancient philosophy emphasised reason – the logos – but Augustine emphasised grace, intellect and feeling, which involves choice (p. 102). Reason has to make sense of a world outside our control and this is made through choice (p. 104). Inwardness of the individual is not a sphere of silence, it is a sphere of dialogue, of conversation with God (p. 105). Augustine puts a lot more emphasis on the inner life of the individual and his individual agency. Whilst there are brief flashes of this in antiquity, the arguments of The Fathers are much closer to the Enlightenment.

            This essay will now look at Thomas Aquinas, who lived during 1225-74, almost a century after Augustine. Once more, Augustine emphasises autonomy: ‘Willing is an internal choice’ (2016, p. 172). However, Aquinas emphasises that, although we have free will, that it is guided by God: ‘God moves us to choose by sort of internal stimulus, infallibly but without comprising our freedom’ (p. 172). The individual is free to choose and this freedom is granted by God. Later liberals such as John Stuart Mill were atheists, although John Locke was not. For Mill, the individual is an autonomous agent. Aquinas also sees the individual as a rational agent, but this freedom is only possible because it is granted by God. For Aquinas, the will is motivated by a goal and the individual usually acts because he is driven towards something: ‘The mover compels what it moves to move’ (p. 174). The individual wills everything himself, he is not driven by something external: ‘I think because I want to, I use all my other abilities and dispositions because I want to’ (p. 177). The will is moved by deliberation, as the individual deliberates about what is best for him and takes facts into consideration (p. 178). This is similar to liberal rationality, as liberals urge others to make informed choices about subjects using facts and logic. Aquinas still clings to God, as he thinks that willing and free choice are stimulated by God. Later Enlightenment thinkers like Spinoza rejected this, as he tried to see the natural world as something fee from divine intervention. However, like the humanists from the Enlightenment, Aquinas sees humans as uniquely different from other animals, as they are equipped with reason (p. 359). Whilst there are some differences between Aquinas and thinkers of the Enlightenment, he places special stress on autonomy, rational choice and the individual much more than the thinkers from Antiquity, who view humans as a social animal. 

            Liberalism places greater emphasis on the individual than the social collective. It is also egalitarian and believes in progress, tolerance and universalism. Rene Descartes showed nascent signs of this when he stated ‘I think therefore I am.’ In the seventeenth century, there had been religious wars between protestants and Catholics. In the end of this century, John Locke argued that governments should promote tolerance of different religious beliefs. However, ancient Greece and the medieval era did not have a liberal ethos. There were strict social norms in ancient Greece, as families lived together and worshipped their ancestors. The patriarch of the family wielded authority and could kill his wife or his children if he wanted to. Following the advent of the city, there were strict roles for citizens and anyone who was not a patriot would be ostracised. These societies also actively promoted inequality, as the aristocracy would rule, but slaves, plebs and women were not citizens. However, Cicero expressed classical liberal ideas on property, as he argued that it should belong to individuals and that states should not take it away from him. In antiquity, property usually belonged to the family. Pericles was a statesman who expanded democracy, freedom and equality. He also tried to make government more transparent, more accountable and less corrupt. Diogenes was an extremely eccentric figure who tried to challenge the strict social norms which were prevalent in Athens. He thought that the masses blindly followed arbitrary norms and he tried to disrupt this with his strange behaviour. Finally, Marcus Aurelius, like Cicero, was a communitarian, but he expressed a liberal opinion when he argued that a society should primarily protect equal rights, freedom of speech and the freedom of its citizens. This also essay also looked at the medieval era, when people lived in oppressive tribes. Medieval societies were also feudal, as serfs lived on a plot of land and were not entitled the same rights as other citizens. However, St. Augustine, early on in the medieval period, argued that all souls are equal. This egalitarian ethos influenced Gregory VI legal reforms, which attempted to make all individuals equal before the law and paved the road to the end of serfdom. Augustine also emphasised individual inwardness and choice. Finally, Thomas Aquinas emphasised that the individual is free to make rational choices, but that this freedom is enabled by God. This is different from Enlightenment thinkers, as they tried to see the natural world as something free from divine intervention. Earlier societies were not liberal, but the thinkers and statemen that this essay look at do show nascent signs of liberalism.

 Works Cited

Aurelius, Marcus. (2006) Translated by Martin Hammond. Meditations. London: Penguin.

Aquinas, Thomas. (2008) Translated by Timothy McDermott. Selected Philosophical Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonney, Richard. (2002) The Thirty Years’ War: 1618-1648. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Bury, J. B. (1920) A History of Greece to the Date of Alexander the Great. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Cicero. (2008) Translated by Niall Rudd. The Republic and the Laws. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Descartes, Rene. (1998) Translated by Desmond M. Clarke. Originally published in 1641. Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings. London: Penguin.

Diogenes the Cynic. (2012) Introduction by Robin Hard. Sayings and Anecdotes with Other Popular Moralists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dunn, John (1984) Locke: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Publishing Press.

Gray, John. (1986) Liberalism. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Martin, Thomas R. (2016) Pericles: A Biography in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum. (2021) The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Spinoza, Benedict. (2007) Originally published in 1670. Translated by Jonathan Israel. Theological-Political-Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siedentop, Larry. (2004). Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism. London: Penguin Books.

Thompson, James Westfall. Johnson, Edgar Nathaniel. (1937) An Introduction to Medieval Europe: 300-1,500. New York Norton & Co.

Wickham, Chris. (2016) Medieval Europe. Yale: Yale University Press.

Vallance, Edward. (2006) The Glorious Revolution: 1688 – Britain’s Fight for Liberty. London: Abacus.

 

Jimmy Carter and Deontology: Tenuous Connections 6

Tenuous Connections 4: The Origins of Water and Thales

Perpetual Flux and Unchanging Singularity: The Ideas of Heraclitus and Parmenides in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury and Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot

Perpetual Flux and Unchanging Singularity: The Ideas of Heraclitus and Parmenides in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury and Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot

Part two of a forthcoming book called Collected Essays: Volume Two.

The pre-Socratic philosophers are often seen as the start of western philosophy and knowledge. Thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides preceded Jesus Christ by some five-hundred years. They looked at ontological and metaphysical issues, which we still think about today. Indeed, Heraclitus’ ideas on change have been compared with Einstein’s discoveries in relativity (Kim 2017, p. 28). Heraclitus emphasised how things always change. Additionally, he had aphoristic insights on ‘the logos’ and as to how we have to use our reason. Although he spoke about fire being the causal factor of everything, which might make him seem like a unitarian, he wrote about clashing opposites and how they create change. Meanwhile, Parmenides claimed that everything that we see has to come out of something and that something cannot come out of nothing. This led him to the extreme view that nothing changes at all and that we live in a continuous present and he thought that there was no creation and no end to the world. This essay will use these ideas in dealing with close readings of two seminal modernist texts – the novel The Sound and the Fury by William Faulkner (1929) and the play Waiting for Godot (1953) by Samuel Beckett. Faulkner used stream of consciousness and interior monologues and his novel covers many points in time and space. Everything is in a constant state of flux and, like many other examples of stream of consciousness, he makes associations between many different things. As such, this essay will compare the novel with Heraclitus’ views on the perpetual flux and it will compare the novel with Heraclitus’ views on the Logos and clashing opposites. On the other hand, Waiting for Godot is situated in the same point in space. The characters joke as to how immobile they are and how so little happens. This essay will apply ideas on ‘what-is’ and the ‘unchanging singularity’ to close readings of the play.

This essay will start by looking at Heraclitus’ views on the underlying unity of the world, which he called ‘the Logos.’ The ‘Logos’ is a multifarious term which was used by many philosophers from ancient Greece and it was integral to Heraclitus’ philosophy. For Heraclitus, it was a principle that created the whole of reality. According to the Logos, there is harmony in the world and there is an underlying rational principle which explains the natural world (Waterfield 2000, p. 32). There is an underlying unity to things and it is divine (p. 33). The whole world is intelligent and alive, it speaks to the wise man and it communicates itself to wise sages like Heraclitus (p. 32). The truth, for Heraclitus, is only accessible through divine understanding; that is, an understanding which exists beyond the natural world (p. 33). Humans live as if they are asleep and they are not aware of it and, although they are not aware of it, the Logos is accessible to everyone, but we fail to see it (p. 33). Indeed, Heraclitus states the following in one of his remaining fragments: ‘Things keep their secrets’ (2003, p. 9). The Logos, the truth of all things, is universally apprehensible (p. 33). The appreciation of things is like the underlying harmony; it requires reflection, not just naïve reliance on the senses (p. 33). As such, Heraclitus casts doubt on the senses and their ability to explain the natural world (p. 33). The data supplied by the senses requires judicious assessment (p. 33). However, Heraclitus places more emphasis on introspection than wide learning and disparages thinkers like Pythagoras for this (p. 33).

            This essay will now examine how the characters perceive the underlying nature of things in the final third person chapter, the chapter narrated by Benjy and Quentin. The final chapter takes place in a church, it is narrated in third person and it is preceded by three viscerally subjective chapters. God might possibly be the closest thing in their society to the Greek Logos, as God is meant to be an omnipresent entity who overlooks all of nature and is only accessible via divine understanding. The church also creates bonds of community amongst the Afro-American and white communities: ‘Thinks he ain’t good enough fer white church, but nigger church ain’t good enough fer him’ (Faulkner 1929, p. 246). The church creates these bonds, but its followers also try to access a divine order. They go to a space where they can come into contact with a divine entity which controls outcomes: ‘Serene, tortured crucifix that transcended its shabbiness and insignificance. (…) Yes, Jesus!’ (Faulkner, 249). Also, the material world is imperfect, as the crucifix ‘transcends’ its ‘shabbiness,’ which suggests that the raw materials fail to approximate its grands significance. Additionally, Heraclitus claimed that we are sleepers who need to wake up and use our reason. This is similar to a lot of Christian rhetoric, as many preachers talk about being ‘awakened,’ ‘redemption’ and ‘born again’: ‘O sinner? I see de resurrection en de light. […] Ye shall live again’ (p. 252). Heraclitus’ awakening involved the use of reason whereas this kind of Christian language is very emotive. Heraclitus was an elitist whilst the characters in this church, and many of Faulkner’s writings, are illiterate and poorly educated. Indeed, the first chapter of the novel is narrated by Benjy who is mentally challenged. Benjy cannot speak, read or write. As such, he relies on his senses and does not use his reason to observe the world. Interestingly, he is also obsessed with fire, one of the central aspects of Heraclitus’ thought.

            The main component of Heraclitus’ thought is the idea of the ‘perpetual flux.’ Although he spoke about the world having an underlying harmony, Heraclitus stressed the flux of things rather than their stability (Waterfield, p. 33). Everything is in a constant state of flux, which is why he opposed unitarians such as Parmenides (p. 34). There is an underlying unity, which he calls the Logos, but this underlying unity occurs at a deeper level (p. 34). On the surface, everything is changing all the time. He has a famous metaphor about a river and how you can never step into it twice: ‘The river where you set your foot just now is gone – those waters giving way to this, now this’ (Heraclitus 2003, p. 27). He states the following in another fragment: ‘Just as the river where I step is not the same, and is, so I am as am not’ (p. 51). Dying and living things are a single continuum and they are all relative to each other (p. 34). Although Heraclitus speaks about a physical flux, he also speaks about an epistemic flux (p. 34). That is, everything changes in the natural world, but the world of knowledge is also always in a state of perpetual motion. Although Heraclitus claimed that everything was always changing, we needed to use our reason, wake up from our sleeping state and look at the underlying unity of things (p. 34). Like other pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus claimed that there was one element that caused everything in the natural world and for Heraclitus this fire was this element. For Thales, possibly the earliest pre-Socratic philosopher, water was the primary element. Everything is in a state of perpetual flux, but fire, the casual factor of everything, always stays the same, partly because it preserves life through warmth (p. 34). He also thought that it was a divine property from the heavens (p. 34).   

            The first two chapters in The Sound and the Fury jump across large periods in space and time. As such, they are similar to Heraclitus’ ‘perpetual flux.’ The first chapter is centred around Benjy, who has severe learning difficulties. Benjy’s mind jumps across several different points in time, presumably due to his mental condition. The font changes from roman numerals to italics so as to signal this, which is jarring for the reader. Additionally, Faulkner makes no attempt to contextualise each episode and this makes things more difficult for the reader. Heraclitus spoke about a physical flux and an epistemic flux, but this chapter is primarily comprised of a mental flux. Everything is indeed in a constant state of flux, but this does not occur in a linear way. Time constantly jumps backwards and forwards in time and different memories are usually ignited by certain feelings. A memory usually appears when he sees a particular object or smells something. For instance, he thinks of his sister Caddy when he sees a fence, as he used to spend time with her there: ‘We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where our shadows were. […] We came to the broken place and went through it’ (p. 2). This reminds him of his sister Caddy: ‘Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through’ (p. 2). He once more thinks of his sister Caddy when his hands get frozen. Once this happens, time shifts to a peculiar sentence: ‘Caddy smelled like trees’ (p. 4). This section is also similar to Heraclitus’ fragment about not being able to step in the same river twice, as memories are constantly being revisited and they acquire new resonances each time Benjy experiences something new. On another occasion, a black character called T. P. talks about the fence: ‘You can’t do no good, moaning and slobbering through the fence’ (p. 42). This instigates a memory of his father talking about the gate: ‘How did you get out, father said. Did you leave the gate when you came in, Jason’ (p. 42). T. P. is also a figure of authority and he jumbles him up with his father, another figure of authority. Similarly, he thinks that he might see his sister Caddy when he sees a group of girls near the fence. Caddy has left the house years ago, but he thinks that she might be with them, even though she would have aged since then: ‘“I’m scared to cross the street.” “He can’t get out.” They came on. I opened the gate and stopped. […] They were going up the hill where it fell away.’ Of course, as Heraclitus claimed, time always changes, but Benjy does not grasp this due to his condition.

            Having examined Benjy’s section, this essay will now examine how Heraclitus’ ideas on the perpetual flux come through in Quentin’s section. By contrast, Quentin is a highly literate and educated character, but his section also includes fragmented, cryptic and idiosyncratic language. Faulkner attempts to recreate his mental breakdown, so he uses stream of consciousness, run-on sentences and unpunctuated sentences. Everything is indeed changing Quentin’s mind; it is once again a mental flux. Interestingly, he has ruminations on the nature of time: ‘An apotheosis in which a temporary state of mind will become symmetrical above the flesh and aware of both itself’ (Faulkner, p. 150). Similarly, he also writes: ‘Natural events and their causes which shadows every mans brow even Benjys and you not thinking of finitude you are contemplating…’ (p. 150). Here he writes about natural events and how time progresses differently for different people. There are natural laws and there is a universal clock, but humans often perceive this through a subjective prism. Certain moments seem to an ‘apotheosis’ and seem to stand apart from other perhaps more mundane moments. Benjy often fixates on certain memories to the detriment of others, for example. Faulkner uses stream of consciousness and the continuous unpunctuated sentences try to capture the way that we think. Indeed, we do not often think in paragraphs and grammatically correct sentences. We also associate different things together. Maurice Ebeleen writes that stream of consciousness lays bare the inner thoughts of characters and stops them from evading unpleasant truths: ‘Stream of consciousness narrative mode evacuates authoritative narration who may meditate, mediate and re-envision the characters’ experiences from a privileged position’ (2014). Indeed, Quentin thinks about different points in time and juxtaposes them within a single protracted sentence: ‘Let us sell Benjy’s pasture so that Quentin may go to Harvard, and I may knock my bones to go together’ (p. 147). Time also encapsulates everything. He quotes his father when he first gives him his watch: ‘I give you the mausoleum of all hope and desire. […] gain the reducto absurdum of all human experience’ (p. 63). Everyone lives within a universal clock, but time can also be mental and subjective, which led to Immanuel Kant claiming that the perception of time is a priori, as it precedes experience (Janiak 2016). Although the perception of time is mental and subjective, everyone it experiences it together, which is what Quentin’s father calls ‘all human experience.’ This is a universal clock, but Quentin’s father emphasises how it is perceived in a particular way by an individual: ‘fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his or her father’s’ (p. 63). However, although there is such a thing as objective time, the subjective memory is selective as to what it remembers: ‘I give it to you not that you may remember time, but that you might forget it’ (p. 63). Time is always changing in an endless perpetual flux, but it is possible for the subjective mind to wander off and detach itself from it: ‘I don’t suppose anybody ever deliberately listens to a watch or a clock. You don’t have to. You can be oblivious to the sound for a long while, then in a second of blinking it can create in the mind unbroken the long diminished time you didn’t hear’ (p. 63). Indeed, time is always changing, but subjective perception is not always in harmony with it. Time is a priori and mental, as Kant would have it, but the perception of time is still intelligible to all of us and he calls this ‘the transcendental apperception’ (Janiak). Additionally, the subjective perception of time is different every time. Moments in the universal clock can feel shorter or longer depending on the individual, which refies the dynamic nature of time. Indeed, this is in keeping with Heraclitus’ view that you can never step into the same river twice: ‘I suppose it takes at least one hour to lose time in, who has been longer than history getting into the mechanical progression of it’ (p. 69). Quentin’s mind is indeed also in a perpetual flux and the deteriorating syntax represents his fragile mental state. Interestingly, Maurice Ebileen writes that Faulkner’s use of stream of consciousness is reminiscent of psychosis (2014). Unlike Benjy, he looks at the underlying nature of things – what Heraclitus would call the Logos – and has ruminations on the nature of time, which are in some cases similar to Heraclitus’ philosophy.

Finally, the other central component of Heraclitus’ thought is the idea of opposites. Heraclitus thought that clashing opposites caused the perpetual flux, but these opposites were heterogenous and they were commensurable with each other. This was also consistent with the idea of fire being the causal factor of everything, since although it preserves warmth it can also be highly destructive (Waterfield, p. 34). Opposites tend to go in different directions, but they are essential to each other. Indeed, he states the following: ‘From the strain of binding opposites comes harmony’ (Heraclitus 2003, p. 46). He uses the bow as a metaphor for this idea: ‘The cosmos works by harmony and tensions, like the lyre and bow’ (2003, p. 37). This tension might also suggest that there is an underlying order and unity in the world beneath the perpetual flux (p. 34). Indeed, many of Heraclitus’ arguments are consistent with this idea of clashing opposites. These opposites include perpetual flux/hidden stability, war/peace, strife/harmony and sleepers/enlightened rationalists (p. 37).

 The Sound and the Fury is similar to this, as it includes three sections which are narrated by very different characters. Quentin, Benjy and Jason have very different temperaments and writing styles. They have clashed with each other because they are family, but they are interdependent despite this conflict. Indeed, Stancey Burton writes the following: ‘All three authors in the novel complement each other in various ways’ (2001, p. 610). In Benjy’s case, his sense of time is skewed due to his mental condition, but his use of language is also highly idiosyncratic and defamiliarizing. Idiosyncratic means that there is a habit that is peculiar to that person whilst defamiliarization involves presenting normal things in a strange way. Benjy cannot even speak let alone write, but Faulkner deliberately writes in this idiosyncratic way so as to capture his way of thinking. He speaks about his sister smelling like trees and he later describes smelling the cold: ‘I could smell the cold flapping’ (p. 10). Benjy’s use of language is peculiar, as he does not know how to even differentiate between smells, particular objects or climates. It is peculiar to claim to ‘smell the cold’ or for his sister Caddy ‘to smell like trees.’ It is defamiliarizing, as it takes things we already know and presents them in an unusual way. Additionally, the reader might not be entirely familiar with Benjy’s condition when he starts reading this section of the book. Indeed, the reader is immediately confronted with very unusual language in the first chapter: ‘I could see them hitting. They were coming toward where the flag was and I went along the fence. Luster was hunting in the grass by the flower tree. They took the flag out, and they went to the table, and he hit and the other hit. Then they went on, and I went along the fence’ (p. 1). Benjy is describing golfing, but he does not know what golfing is, or its terminology, due to his mental condition. Once more, the language is idiosyncratic and defamiliarizing. The writing style is quite episodic, detached and fragmented, which once more emphasises his limited cognitive abilities.

            This essay will examine Quentin’s use of language and his temperament and consider how he is the opposite of Benjy. Quentin, by contrast, is quite philosophical: ‘The field only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools’ (p. 63). He also writes about ‘constant speculation’ (p. 64). Benjy recounts surface level emotion and he uses peculiar language. Benjy has not even been socialised and does not have the cognitive ability so as to speak, learn, read or think. Quentin, meanwhile, offers philosophical ruminations on ontology and the nature of time. Benjy’s writing is episodic; he writes in a fragmented way. He writes in the following way: ‘and then… and then…’ However, Quentin’s style is more fluid, but his style becomes more fragmented and detached once his mental health deteriorates. His lexical choices are much more sophisticated and he uses complicated metaphors: ‘reducto absurdum’ (p. 63), ‘impervious shadow’ (p. 80), ‘affinity for evil’ (p. 80), ‘ubiquitous and garrulous’ (p. 81). However, his style becomes increasingly idiosyncratic as his mental health deteriorates: ‘Watching pennies more stars than Jews’ (p. 151). The later sections of this chapter have no punctuation, have run-on sentences and different ideas are enmeshed within the same sentence. Quentin is introspective and he is a Harvard student whilst Benjy is ‘an idiot full of sound and fury.’ Both chapters use stream of consciousness and interior monologues and reveal the interiority of the characters, but they portray different people. They are brothers and they are obsessed with their sister Caddy. As Heraclitus noted, opposites clash with each other, but they complement each other and develop each other. Both characters grew up together and had a formative influence on their character.

            The third chapter in the book is devoted to the character Jason. He is unpleasant and vitriolic by temperament and his use of language is colloquial and steeped in the vernacular of southern USA. Benjy and Quentin often use idiosyncratic language, such as ‘I saw them hitting’ and ‘Caddy smelled like trees.’ By contrast, Quentin uses more refined language, but it becomes more idiosyncratic. However, Jason has clearly been more socialised and his use of language reflects his local culture. Benjy has not been socialised at all due to his cognitive impairment whilst Quentin is more literary, bookish, lexically richer and detached from his local culture. Jason uses colloquialisms and he uses racist and sexist language which reflects prevalent social attitudes. He speaks in a sexist way about his daughter Quentin [no relation to his brother]: ‘Once a bitch, always a bitch’ (p. 153). He speaks thusly about blacks: ‘Six niggers that can’t even stand.’ (p. 153). He speaks in the vernacular of his local culture: ‘Well, I says’ (p. 153). He is aggressive by temperament, he chases his daughter throughout this chapter and he is prone to losing his temper: ‘You’ll lose your temper with her’ (p. 153). Heraclitus said that opposites are ‘like the lyre and the bow’ and that they depend on each other to make them function. Benjy, Quentin and Jason are all brothers, but they have all shaped each other in varying ways due to their upbringing.  

            Meanwhile, Parmenides is often seen as being the polar opposite of Heraclitus, since he claimed that things did not change at all. His philosophy started with the premise that anything that we can think about either ‘is or is not’ (Waterfield, p. 50). Indeed, it is often claimed that Parmenides’ philosophy is the first attempt at ontology (Sedley 1998), the study of being and existence. Parmenides makes a distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what-is-not.’ ‘What is’ is something that exists and something that we can predicate things onto (p. 50). Thinking and being are interchangeable and co-extensive; we only think about things that exist, we do not think of things that do not exist (p. 51). However, we can clearly think of things that do not exist and Waterfield offers the examples of unicorns and the king of Australia (p. 51). Indeed, Parmenides says the following in the eponymous Platonic dialogue Parmenides: ‘For that which is said “not to be” is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things’ (Plato 2015, p. 80). This means that connotations only emerge out of things that we recognise and that we cannot think of an ‘attributeless entity’ (p. 51). We can either say that ‘X is…’ or ‘X is not…’ and the ellipses are filled with different predicates. We cannot identify ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ precisely because the predicates are often different; a thing either ‘is’ or ‘is not.’ (p. 52). Parmenides emphasises that something cannot come to existence out of nothing (p. 52). ‘What-is-not’ has no properties, so we cannot explain how it can generate the properties of ‘what-is’ (p. 52). ‘What-is-must be’ appears to be deduced from ‘what-is can be’ (p. 52). These two propositions are identical, since there can never be anything other than ‘what can be’ (p. 52). Hence, ‘what-is’ is an unchanging entity, as ‘what-is’ cannot come out of nothing.

            It is possible to find similarities between Parmenides’ philosophy and Waiting for Godot by Samuel Beckett. The characters in the play really do exist. For instance, Vladimir says the following about Estragon: ‘I’m glad to see you back. I thought you had gone forever’ (p. 9). Estragon clearly is something and he clearly does exist. Anything that exists, according to Parmenides, either is or is not and we can predicate things onto it. Thinking and being might be identical and we can clearly think about something that does exist. In the context of the play, Estragon is clearly there: ‘I’m glad to see you’ (p. 9). The surroundings, however, are artificial and it is unclear if they are really there: ‘“A ditch? Where?” (Without gesture) “Over there.”’ We can speak about something if it has certain attributes and we cannot speak about an attributeless entity. Estragon speaks about sleeping in a ditch without specifying where the ditch is. According to Waterfield, we can think of a unicorn or a king of Australia in our minds, but they have no basis in reality. A ditch does have a basis in reality, but Estragon does not show us where this ditch is. Parmenides says that something must come out of something and that something cannot come into being out of something that does not exist. ‘What-is-not’ has no properties, so it cannot generate ‘what-is.’ The ditch cannot exist if we cannot find the point in space where it belongs. Otherwise, like a unicorn, it is just a product of the imagination. The surroundings seem to be artificial and Godot himself seems to be artificial: ‘“You took me for Godot. […] “Who is he?” “Oh, he’s a… kind of acquaintance.” “Nothing of the kind, we hardly know him. […] Personally, I wouldn’t even know him if I saw him’ (p. 23). Vladimir hesitates when he speaks about Godot and his language is evasive, which suggests that he is making it up. He is ‘a kind of acquaintance’ and this is preceded by ellipses, which suggests that he is unsure as to what he is talking about. Later on, they attempt to predicate attributes onto Godot: ‘“What does he do, Mr. Godot?” “He does nothing, sir.” “Has a beard, Mr. Godot.” “I think it’s white, sir’ (p. 92). According to Parmenides, X either is… or is… not and the ellipses are filled with different predicates. They attempt to impute different characteristics onto Godot, but they attempt to do so with an entity that does not exist, so it is therefore talking about a product of the mind.

            Additionally, the play also deals with religion, which raises further ontological questions: ‘“Did you ever read the bible?” “Do you remember the gospels?” “I remember the maps of the Holy Land’ (p. 21). The character that they wait for, Godot, never arrives. Hence, it is not clear whether he even exists and whether he has any properties. Godot is like much religion; he is not of this world. Many critics have recognised that the play has religious resonances (Amin 2019). We cannot speak about the properties of something if we do not know what generated these properties. Similarly, the ‘Holy Land’ is something supernatural and it is not of this world. It is something that we talk about and it is something that we can attribute things to, but it is not something that we can empirically verify; it is something supernatural. Similarly, Godot never appears and he is only talked about, so, like much religion, it is unclear whether he exists.

            Parmenides line of reasoning led him to claim that ‘what-is’ – everything that we see – is unborn, imperishable, entire, unique and unchanging, which he calls ‘an unchanging singularity’ (p. 52). Thus, Parmenides repudiated all of his predecessors who tried to explain phenomena with claims about creation and change and he posed a challenge to philosophers who came after him (p. 53). Creation must take place either from ‘what-is’ or from ‘what-is-not.’ According to Parmenides, ‘what-is’ exists in an unbroken continuum, starting from the infinite past and into the infinite future. Additionally, all parts of reality are part of a greater whole. Parmenides states the following in one of Plato’s dialogues: ‘Every part is part of a whole’ (Plato 2015, p. 40). He also says the following: ‘Parts, as we affirm, have a relation to the whole’ (p. 75). As such, he claimed that there can be no creation in the past or future (p. 53). However, ‘what-is’ is not imperishable, as the same arguments eliminate perishing (p. 53). ‘What-is’ is an unchanging singularity and it is continuous in space and time and all kinds of change are not possible (p. 53). ‘What-is’ is also complete, perfect and spherical, which would lead certain people to wonder what lies beyond the sphere (p. 54). He uses the metaphor of the sphere because a sphere is the same in every direction that you look at it, both from the inside and the outside (p. 54). Finally, Parmenides also has more of a theological bent than Heraclitus. A goddess claims that the unchanging singularity is an epistemological truth (p. 54). Mortals make the mistake of following the world of the senses, but there is only the world of the unchanging singularity, which is the world of reason rather than the senses (p. 55). This is similar to Heraclitus, as he claimed that the Logos was the world of reason and that it required the use of reason rather than the senses to understand it.

            The characters in Waiting for Godot seem to be stuck in a state of stasis. Time does not seem to pass; there is no past, present or future. At one point, the characters interact thusly: “That passed the time.” “It would have passed in any case.” “Yes, but not so rapidly” (p. 94). The characters joke as to how they are stuck in the same predicament – they are always together, waiting for Godot. Indeed, they mention that they never change: ‘“Very likely. They all change. Only we can’t’ (p. 48). They often emphasise how immobile they are and how they cannot move: ‘“Let’s go.” “We can’t.” “Why not?” “We’re waiting for Godot” (p. 48). Their purpose, and the purpose of the play, is to wait for Godot. So much so that they cannot move and they are always stuck in the same point in space. The characters themselves seem to become interchangeable and it is difficult to differentiate them: ‘“We know them. […] Unless they’re not the same’ (p. 48). The sphere in Parmenides philosophy is always the same every way that you look at it. In the play, they are always talking about the same thing and they are always talking about waiting for Godot. If Godot exists, he exists outside the sphere. All change in Parmenides is eliminated and, indeed, very little change occurs throughout the play. Indeed, the play ends with the same shtick: ‘“Come back tomorrow?” “Yes.” (p. 93)’ They always carry on. Godot seems to be their salvation, even if they carry on with the same repetitive routine: ‘“We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow. Unless Godot comes.” “And if he comes.” “We’ll be saved” (p. 93). Indeed, the description of Act II reifies this: ‘Next day. Same time. Same place’ (p. 55). Nothing changes; all of the characters meet in the same place and time with the same purpose.

            Heraclitus claimed that most people are in a state of sleep and cannot use their reason to see the underlying nature of things, which he called ‘the Logos,’ which is divine. The final chapter takes place in a church, the closest contemporaneous equivalent of ‘the Logos,’ as the characters attempt to reach a divine understanding. The character Benjy relies on his senses and he cognitively impaired whilst his brother Quentin, a Harvard graduate, uses his reason so as to understand the nature of things. Everything constantly changes in Faulkner’s novel. In the first chapter, time constantly shifts back and forth in time and this is due to Benjy’s condition. It is a mental, not physical, flux. The shifts in time are usually triggered due to certain feelings. Meanwhile, Quentin’s chapter also jumps about in time and his mental health deteriorates. He also has philosophical ruminations on the nature of time and as to how individuals perceive time differently from a ‘universal clock.’ This essay also examined Heraclitus’ ideas on the nature of opposites and how they complement each other. The three principal characters in the novel – Benjy, Quentin and Jason – are opposites who complement each other. Benjy writes in a peculiar way due to his condition whilst Quentin writes in a more sophisticated and literary way. Jason, meanwhile, writes in a way that reflects the local vernacular. Their personalities are all drastically different as well, but they have all developed each other in varying ways, which is in line with Heraclitus’ views on opposites. Waiting for Godot is similar to Parmenides thought, as the play does not change very much. The surroundings seem artificial and the characters ponder whether they exist or not. They talk about things which have no basis in reality, which is similar to Parmenides’ thought on ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not.’ The play has some ideas on religion and the supernatural, which is not of this world and outside ‘the sphere.’ Parmenides wrote as to how things need to come out of something, they cannot come out of nothing. The characters speak about things that do not seem to be real, such as Godot. Finally, the play is like ‘the unchanging singularity’ which Parmenides wrote about, as they always meet in the same place and they always wait for Godot. These are the aspects of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides thought which this essay has identified in The Sound and the Fury by William Faulkner and Waiting for Godot by Samuel Beckett.

Works Cited

            Beckett, Samuel. (1978) Waiting for Godot. Originally published in 1956. London: Faber.

Burton, Stacey. (2001) ‘Rereading Faulkner: Authority, Criticism and The Sound and the Fury.’ In Modern Philology. 48: 4.

Ebileen, Maurice. (2014) ‘Benjy’s Howl: Farom Symptom to Sinthome in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.’ In Figures in the Lacanian Field. 12:1.

Faulkner, William. (1995) The Sound and the Fury. Originally published in 1929. London: Vintage.

            Heraclitus. (2003) Fragments. Translated by Brooks Haxton. London: Penguin.

            Janiak, Andrew. (2020) ‘Kant’s Views on Space and Time.’ In The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/kant-spacetime/>

Kim, Yung. (2017) New Genesis: Hyperspace Revelations.

Plato. (2008) Parmenides. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Mississippi: Gutenberg E-book.

            Sedley, David. (1990) ‘Parmenides’ in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward Craig. New York: Routledge.

Waterfield, Robin. (2000). The First Philosophers: The Pre-Socratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

            Yamin, Momen Yaseen M. (2019) Symbolic Analysis of Waiting for Godot: A Critical Comparison Between the Bible and Quran Symbols in Waiting for Godot. In Studies in Literature and Language. 19: 3.   

Liberty, Equality and Fraternity: The Ideals of the French Revolution in Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Three Colours Trilogy

This is part one of a forthcoming book called Collected Essays: Volume Two.

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Krzysztof Kieslowksi made a trilogy of films about the three colours of the French flag, which are called Blue (1993), White (1993) and Red (1994). These colours symbolise the values of the French Revolution – liberty, equality and fraternity. However, Kieslowski acknowledges that the trilogy’s relationship with the French revolution is oblique and that he primarily chose the subject because the funding came from France. Similarly, he made a series of films in his native Poland called The Decalogue (1989), which were loosely based on the ten commandments. This essay will not be interested in Kieslowski’s intentions, it will be interested in identifying aspects of political philosophy in these three films. It will consider political theories on liberty, equality and fraternity and it will briefly introduce theories from several influential political philosophers. It will later ascertain how these theories are represented in the three films.

Kieslowski’s earlier films had political undercurrents and they subtly criticised the communist regime in Poland, but they were chiefly concerned with more existentialist issues such as personal freedom, identity and moral choice. Indeed, Jonathan Romney writes: ‘There is something old-school existentialist about him’ (2011). Although Blue is ostensibly based on the ideals of the French revolution, Kieslowksi stressed that the film is not political: ‘We’re talking about individual freedom, a profound freedom, freedom of life’ (Romney 2011). His Polish productions were politically charged whilst his international films became more abstract. However, his Polish productions and his later international productions were about individuals who attempted to reconcile daily lives with ‘cultural myths, be they communist propaganda, Biblical proverbs or French Revolutionary slogans’ (Cummings 2003). Indeed, the trilogy is often concerned with non-political themes: ‘A nuanced and even playful approach to narrative, the paradoxes of chance, the interconnectedness of lives and a central importance given to art and performance (both public and private)’ (Cummings 2003). Kieslowski decided to make the film about the French revolution due the to the funding (Romney). However, Richard Armstrong writes: ‘[the films contain] a tension between the personal and the political’ (2007, p. 278).  However, political ideals do underpin the characters’ personal choices.

            Liberty, equality and fraternity were the ideals of the French revolution, so this essay will briefly examine its history. Inequality permeated the whole of pre-revolutionary Europe, which made revolution seem propitious. For instance, the peasantry comprised 80% of the population in France, one half of peasants owned no capital and they bore the brunt of heavy taxation (Rude 1964, p. 23). Prices rose by 30% between 1730 and 1789 and wages only increased by 22% (Rude, p. 26). Workers had no social protections and were subjected to serfdom (p. 26). However, the growth of industry soon led to an urban working class and to an industrial revolution (p. 26). Unlike the Russian revolution, it was a liberal revolution and it overturned the political and social structure of France (Droz 1967, p. 7). However, it later led to a conservative counter-revolution. Hegel was one of its main proponents and he argued that the state embodied a community which preceded and endured its individual members. Hegel thought that individuals had no substance; they were merely members of a state (Droz, p. 14). The period of 1815-1848 led to the rise of middle classes, which had prospered from the French Revolutions’ (p. 37). In keeping with the ideals of the French Revolution, the state for them was a guardian of freedom. It should not intervene in the economy or the organisation of society. Although society was riven with poverty, the role of the state was ‘negative’ (Droz, p. 45). Although the French Revolution did eventually create a middle class, it also led to a reign of terror. Robespierre became the leader of France and he believed that a more centralised state could create a more equitable society (Egan 1938, p. 27). He wanted to create a classless and co-operative society (22). He derived his ideas from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a thinker who wrote about ‘the general will’ of the people (p. 27). Similarly, Robespierre believed that everyone should be directed to a single purpose (p. 91). Robespierre would have shuddered at the idea of an authoritarian or totalitarian state – he believed in the ideals of liberty and equality – but this is what he ended up creating (P. 89). Indeed, Egan writes that he turned from ‘a liberal humanist’ to ‘nationalist zealot’ between 1789 and1794 (p. 89). Eventually, Napoleon inherited this centralised state apparatus (Broers 1996, p. 6).  

            The philosophical foundations that opposed and supported the French Revolution were propounded in Edmund Burke’s Reflection on the Revolution in France (1790) and Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791). Burke defended the monarchy and argued that the rule of law and other customs had taken thousands of years to accomplish. It was therefore capricious to attempt to destroy it: ‘It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models or patterns’ (1790, p. 74). For a conservative, principles are established after attaining power, they do not precede it. As such, laws and political problems should respond to real problems which already exist. On the other hand, Paine argued that liberty should be extended to everyone and that we are all entitled to natural rights. He included a ‘declaration of the rights of man’ in his book, where he lists the principles of the French Revolution. These include the following principles: ‘1) Men should be free and equal in all respects. 2) All citizens should be entitled to liberty, property, security and resistance of oppression. 3) Everyone should have political liberty and should be able to do what they want as long as they do not harm others. 4) All men are free to exercise their liberty, although they are circumscribed by the law. 5) The law should only prohibit actions that harm society. 6) the law is an expression of the ‘general will’ of the community and citizens can agree or disagree with these laws. 7) The community is entitled to all honours and employment, which should be based on their skills and virtue. 8) No man should be arrested arbitrarily and they should only be arrested when they break the law 9) The law should only impose penalties that are necessary. 10) Every man should be presumed innocent before being convicted. 11) No man should be convicted because of political or religious opinions. 12) Everyone should be able to speak and think freely. 13) Policing is necessary so as to protect these rights. 14) Everyone should contribute to public expenses, but these contributions should be divided equally and based on the ability of each individual. 15) Each citizen has a right to determine how much each individual should contribute. 16) Every society requires a political constitution. 17) Everyone has a right to property and no-one should be deprived of it, unless it is of the utmost public necessity. 18) Finally, all elected representatives should be held accountable to its citizens (1791, p. 350-352). These were the central principles of the French Revolution.

            This essay will now look at political philosophies of liberty, which is broadly defined as the freedom to do certain things. It will start by looking at Issiah Berlin’s ideas on ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. ‘Negative liberty’ is defined as ‘freedom from interference’ whilst positive liberty is defined as ‘the freedom to do something’. Berlin says the following about negative liberty: ‘What is the area within the subject – a person or group of persons – should be left to do or be what he is able to do without interference from other persons?’ (1969, p. 3). On the other hand, this is how Berlin defines positive liberty: ‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine to, or be, this or that?’ (p. 3). According to negative liberty, an individual is free when no-one interferes in his activity (p.3). An individual is unfree when he is prevented from doing something. There are external societal factors that prevent freedom, such as poverty (p. 4). Berlin also says that mental and physical incapacities also prevent freedom. Berlin: ‘The wider the area of non-interference, the wider my freedom’ (p. 4). According to Berlin, social harmony and equality can only be achieved by bestowing a private life to individuals. Crucially, neither the state nor any other entity should intervene in the private realm (p. 6). On the other hand, positive liberty aims to provide resources which make individuals free. Liberty means that the individual wants to be a ‘master’ of his own destiny. An individual is ‘a subject, not an object’ and he is ‘moved by reasons, conscious purposes, which are my own’ (p. 8). However, Berlin admits that coercing an individual in the name of a higher goal can sometimes be justified. These include causes such as public health, social justice, the fight against fascism, etc. (p. 9). However, Berlin points out that definitions of what is good and just vary drastically amongst individuals (p. 9). In some cases, however, coercion in the name of the common good might enlarge one’s own liberty (p. 9). The Second World War is a good example of this, as many people argued that the fight against fascism was an attempt to protect individual freedom.

            However, some liberals wanted to create ‘an enabler state.’ Social liberals, as opposed to ‘classical liberals,’ wanted to create state resources that intervened in the economy and combated poverty. They did this because they wanted to heighten, not diminish, individual freedom. William Beveridge provided the intellectual formulation of ‘welfare state’ in his ‘Beveridge report.’ On the other hand, classical liberals argue that state resources create dependency and that they intrude into the private lives of individuals. Social liberals, meanwhile, argue that they empower the individual by providing him with resources such as money, health and education. It enriches their autonomy, as opposed to creating dependency. Supporters of positive liberty believe that a degree of wealth redistribution enriches individual liberty (Sloman 2015). Martha Nussbaum, a social liberal, views negative liberty ‘as an incoherent idea,’ as all our choices are either permitted or inhibited by others. All choices depend on resources such as education, health, food, etc. The state should provide resources such as education, health and redistributive welfare and they develop the capacities of the individual (Nussbaum 2011, p. 65).

             However, as this essay identified, Kieslowski was mainly interested in personal, not political, freedom. Robert J. Havinghurst writes about the individualism of the west and contrasts it with the ‘groupism’ of the east. In line with Berlin’s ideas, he writes that freedom involves the absence of constraint and the freedom to speak or assemble (1952, p. 230). However, Havinghurst writes that excessive individualism can lead to loneliness and isolation. As such, people need some sense of belonging, such as nationhood and family. Western societies are more individualistic, and have less encroachment from the state, than the communistic east (p. 235). These societies emphasise personal freedom. On the other hand, several political philosophers have argued that political freedom is more important than personal freedom. Hannah Arendt did this in her book On Revolution (1963), where she emphasised participatory democracy and self-government. Freedom, for her, was public; that is, ‘it was a network of relation between human beings' (Wellmer 1999, p. 84). In a liberal democracy, the state must recognise that each individual is an end in itself, has equal value and that he has a right to choose the life that he wants to lead. Moral rights and values emerge from our intrinsic humanity, not political institutions (Wellmer, p. 91). In private, however, the individual is free to choose what to do without interference from the state (p. 91). In the public sphere, however, members of the community are equal and they have the power to influence decisions (p. 91). Hence, Arendt placed more emphasis on political freedom whilst Issiah Berlin thought that personal freedom was more important (p. 94). Although Arendt shared some concern for a liberal conception of rights, she thought that it was a necessary precondition for political freedom, which involved ‘self-government based on common action and shared deliberation’ (Dybikowski 1981, 208).

            This essay will now ascertain how these ideas are represented in the film. Julie is played by Julliette Binoche and she talks to a lawyer in one scene. She is framed via a mid-shot and the values of liberty are reinforced by the blue wallpaper and the saturation. The lawyer is framed via a mid-shot. Julie tells him: ‘You’ll take care of mother. No-one must know. The money will go to the same account.’ Julie is on the left side of the mid-shot and the entire room is covered in blue wallpaper. The lawyer says: ‘May I ask you why?’ The mid-shot tilts down and reveals Julie holding blue wrapping and this once more reifies the underlying value of liberty. She says: ‘No.’ The lighting, the saturation and the mise-en-scene allude to the revolutionary ideal of freedom. Most viewers, however, would be aware of this, as the title of the trilogy patently alludes to it. The scene also references ideas on positive and negative liberty, as Julie wants no interference from others so that she can be free to pursue her own freedom. She is not prevented from doing this and, in that sense, her liberty is negative. The state does not tell her how to lead her life, she is an end in herself and she chooses how to act. Political intuitions do not determine her choices and she makes her own choices. She also cuts herself off from family and friends and she wants no interference from either them or the state. By contrast, positive liberty interferes in society so as to enhance the choices that people make. In this particular scene, Julie relies on a lawyer to take care of her accounts. As such, she still relies on other individuals and institutions that either permit or inhibit her choices. Later on, she relies on a landlord to rent an apartment and on utility companies for electricity, gas, etc. Nussbaum claims that negative liberty is an incoherent idea, as all individual choices are dependent on resources which are controlled by others. However, Julie is still free to pursue the life that she individually wants to lead.

            Oliver is a family acquaintance and a composer. This essay will analyse a scene where Julie cuts herself off from him and it will bear in mind ideas on negative and positive liberty. The scene starts with a mid-shot. Oliver stands on the far right of the screen and it is dark outside. Once more, the screen is saturated with the colour blue, which reinforces themes of political liberty. There is more light on Oliver side of the frame, but the rest of the frame is enveloped in darkness. The sound design is comprised of the sound of rain. The camera work edits to a mid-shot of Julie, who is on the left side of the frame and it later tilts up to reveal Oliver. The mise-en-scene is once more comprised of blue wallpaper and the sky is tinged with blue. The camera work edits to a close-up shot of Julie and Oliver kissing. The camera work soon edits to reveal a mid-shot Oliver sleeping, where there is a lot of contrast between dark and light. Julie is placed on the left side of the screen whilst Oliver lies on the right side of the frame. This mid-shot is followed by a close-up and the framing of the bodies emphasises their distance from each other. The camera work edits to a close-up shot of Julie smiling, where she is surrounded by a blue backdrop. She says: ‘I appreciate what you did for me. Now you see, I’m like any other woman. I sweat, I cough, I have cavities. You won’t miss me. You understand that now.’ The camera work edits to a close-up shot of Oliver who looks bemused. The mid-shot creates a sense of union between the two characters whilst the close-us create a sense of distance. This is followed by a low-angle mid-shot of Julie walking away and we see it from Oliver’s perspective. Julie’s liberty is negative, as she is cutting herself off from others. However, there is nothing political in this scene because it is about personal relations. However, in other scenes Julie does rely on political institutions to extricate herself from others. On the other hand, this scene deals with her private life, where she cuts off contact with a close relation. She does this so as to focus on her personal freedom, where she is free to do what she wants to do. She is free to pursue whatever she wants to do in her private life and she is unencumbered by responsibilities or the kind of ‘common action’ that Arendt prescribed.

            These two scenes demonstrate how Julie tries to cut off herself off from others. In other words, it shows how she exercises her ‘negative liberty’ and personal freedom. Kieslowski claims that he was more interested in personal freedom, but there is one scene where she connects to a higher political ideal. Her husband composed a piece about the ideals of the European Union and she attempts to complete it after he passes away. The piece is about values which transcend national borders, it is internationalist and it is about values which a community of nations adhere to. These values are higher than the self and the personal relations which the rest of the film deals with. Indeed, Julie starts to reconnect with society and with others once she starts writing the piece. The scene starts with a mid-shot of a television set in a night club and it is followed with a 125-degree close-up of Julie. The TV program is once more saturated by blue and the set design is blue. Oliver says: ‘The concerto will be played by twelve symphonic orchestras in the twelve united European cities.’ The camera, framed via a close-up, pans across the score. This was during the early 90s, following the demise of communism and the so-called ‘end of history.’ The ideals of this piece are higher than the ideals of the nation state, they are about ideals which transcend borders. A later scene depicts Julie and Oliver working on the score together and it starts with a mid-shot of Oliver’s apartment. This is followed with an extreme close-up of the score, which pans across the piece as the score plays in the background. The camera blurs out of focus, so that the music comes to the fore. The editing later alternates between mid-shots of Julie and Oliver and they are framed via 125 or 175 angles. In these scenes, Julie reconnects with higher political ideals of the ideals and she also reconnects with intimate personal relations, as she becomes Oliver’s partner. The film recreates this with mid-shots of Julie and Olivier, which conveys their close personal relationship. It conveys the connection with political ideals via extreme close-ups of the score, the soundtrack of the score and the blue tinge on the screen.

            This essay has examined the ideals of freedom in Blue and it will now examine the ideals of equality in White, which is also a multifarious term. The broad meaning is that people should be treated the same way and that no-one should be entitled to unfair privileges. Commentators talk about ‘freedom to what’ and ‘equality of what,’ as both terms have different meanings. This essay has already examined positive, negative, personal and political freedom. It will now examine the equal worth of individuals, equality of outcome and opportunity, the ideas of John Rawls and the ideas of R. H. Tawney. Richard Arneson defines egalitarianism as the belief that people should be treated the same way and that everyone is of equal worth (2013). Meanwhile, Nicholas Kirby makes a distinction between equal worth and equal authority. Equal worth is the belief that each individual is of each worth whilst equal authority is the belief that no individual should be under the natural authority of anyone else (2018, p. 297). Equal worth was originally based on the idea that what is good for the individual and society would lead to redemption in heaven. After Christianity, Jeremy Bentham argued that individual happiness was considered good if the lower rungs of society were as equally happy as the higher ones (p. 303). Meanwhile, unequal authority involves differences in race, sex, class, education, prosperity, age, virtues, talents, etc. (p. 303). Kirby writes that individuals have equal rights and that everyone should be able to make laws through the ballot box and consensual decision making (p. 304). Each individual has authority over himself and the ability to determine his own decisions, but no individual should have authority over another individual (p. 304). The democratic conception of society views individuals as equal members/citizens of a community (p. 305), which has led to certain kinds of liberals warning about ‘the tyranny of the majority’ (p. 305). Over time, however, societies have diversified, which has incorporated a multiplicity of values. As time passes, the individual has less in common with the majority and we start to speak less of a communal self (p. 305). According to Rosseau, the government is a body which rules everyone, but the continues to have the authority to rule himself. When the government enforces its rules over the individual, it forces him to obey his previous exercise of authority (p. 308). Kant, meanwhile, claims that laws are given to the individual, but these laws are universal and they are commensurable with his autonomous choices (p. 308).

            This essay will analyse a scene of a court scene in White and it will look at these ideas on equal worth and equal authority. In a democratic society, all individuals are equal under the rule of law. Everyone is of equal worth and the law should not discriminate on the grounds of race, class or gender. The law should be ‘the servant’ of its people, not its ‘master.’ This scene starts with a long shot in the right-hand corner of the building, where several lawyers walk around. The building is brightly luminated. The lawyers wear black and they walk on top of the patterned white floor. All of the lawyers are in a higher position in society, although everyone is equal under the rule of law. The film edits to a court room and it starts with a low angle mid-shot in the left-hand corner of the room. This is followed with a high angle long-shot of the courtroom in the centre of the room. The judge is in the middle, Karol is on the left and his wife Dominique is on the right. The film later edits to close-ups of both Karol and Dominique. At this point, Karol says: ‘Where’s my equality? Is not speaking French a reason for the court to refuse to hear my case?’ The judge says: ‘What is it you want?’ Karol: ‘I need time to save my marriage.’ This is followed with close-ups of Karol and Dominque. Karol does not feel that the law is treating him as an equal, as he cannot speak French and he speaks through an interpreter. He feels that the law is not being just, as it is treating him unequally because of his nationality. According to Kant, the law should be universal and follow universal laws of justice, morality, etc. Nationhood should not be brought to the fore, as the law should be universal and should be applied equally to people from different cultures. The law in this scene is not really being the servant of the individual, either. He has been deprived of some freedom and someone else decide his own fate. Karol is not really of equal worth, since he struggles to communicate and he has no financial security following his divorce. The alternating close-ups of Karol and Dominique emphasises their position in society whilst the long-shot of the judge emphasises his loftiness.      

            This essay will now distinguish between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. Equality of outcome attempts to equalise what people become rather than where they begin, which is what equality of opportunity tries to do (Phillips 2004, p. 1). Equality of outcome attempts to equalise resources, but people argue that this ignores the diversity of societies, as people’s preferences vary enormously (p. 1). As such, the division of resources leaves either an excess or scarcity of what different people consider either valuable or worthless (p. 1). This is sometimes called the politics of envy, as ‘it attacks achievements that stray above the norm’ (p. 2). On the other hand, the opposite argument claims that people should not expect to have the same amount of happiness, misery or commodities, but they can expect to have the same opportunities to thrive (p. 2). Phillips: ‘[It is important to distinguish between] inequalities that arise from circumstances beyond our own control and those legitimate ones that arise from the exercise of personal choice’ (p. 2). Ronald Dworkin writes that the obsession with income redistribution overlooks the choices that people make with the resources which are available to them (p. 3). As such, any redistribution of resources should take into account the decisions that people make with their lives (p. 3). It is odd to insist that everyone should do the same thing with their time. However, equalising income would make more sense, as it would enable individuals to do what they want with their money, which equalise starting points, not outcomes (p. 4). However, given differences in preferences it is also odd to say that everyone should devote their time to accumulating money (p. 4). As such, resources matter more than incomes. If you lack resources to do things, you will not be able to do anything. For instance, a disabled person needs a wheelchair to move (p. 5). For this reason, Phillips argues that welfare focuses too much on differences between income rather than on individuals as autonomous beings. Public resources such as education, health, etc. should empower them to choose to lead the lives that they individually want to lead (p. 6). Additionally, equality of opportunity takes into account ‘bad luck’ arguments, such as being born with a physical or mental condition or being born into poverty (p. 2).

            ‘Equality of outcome’ has been to some degree attempted in the western world, when governments redistribute wealth through progressive tax rates. Indeed, one of the main objectives of European social democratic parties is to create a more equitable distribution of income (Kastning 2013). However, equality of outcome has been more assiduously implemented in the Soviet Union, as communism aimed to level income distribution completely. However, the abolition of private property did not lead to the elimination of classes or inequality (Schwartz and Pease 1973, p. 141). Although the French and American revolutions were interested in equality, the Russian and Chinese revolutions aimed to create classless societies, but classes continued to exist (p. 141). The first period of the Soviet Union aimed to create radical levelling, but the second period led ‘to a more differentiated status system’ (p. 142). Lenin’s first period levelled incomes drastically, but this was relaxed during the New Economic Policy. The most ambitious attempt at levelling involved the collectivisation of agriculture and the persecution of the Kulaks. After this third period, the distribution of income became more pronounced because income tax laws ended up favouring the highest paid members of society (p. 142). Contrary to the communistic ethos, this led to a greater income differential between ‘manual’ and ‘mental’ workers (p. 144). Additionally, the communists were disdainful towards leisure activities and tended to prioritise activities which were socially useful (p. 149).

            Kieslowski released White two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although people talked about ‘the end of history,’ and about exporting social and economic liberalism to the east, the transition to capitalism and liberal democracy faltered. Boris Yeltsin lifted price controls, prices returned to normal levels and inflation soared to 1,000% in 1992 (Steele 2007). The government sold off state assets and created a class of oligarchic billionaires (Steele). Indeed, White deals with this, as the protagonist makes millions through the black market. One scene depicts him prying on a conversation and he discovers that two people plan to buy a plot of state-owned land and build warehouses. The scene starts with a close-up of a man talking; the camera is placed at the back of the car and framed via a 70-degree angle. This is followed with a 180 degree shot of Karol feigning sleep. One of them says: ‘But if we triple the investment… that’d be very smart.’ The sky is grey and the car is white, which reinforces the values of equality. The scene starts with a mid-shot of the car driving up the hill, but it soon edits to a 270 degree angle of a close-up shot of the man in the car. There is a 180 degree angle mid-shot, from Karol’s perspective, of the two men talking. The camera pans to the left and follows their movements. They talk about a ‘30% profit.’ This is followed with a 180 degree mid-shot of Karol prying on the conversation. The camera angles are often subjective and from the point of view of Karol. The decision to film on location reifies the values of equality, as they are surrounded by snowy and a wintery climate. Karol was born into the lower rungs of communist Poland, where class inequalities continued to exist. This is why he moves to Paris, but he is still treated badly. However, he becomes wealthy through sheer luck, which might emphasise the arbitrary nature of capitalistic equality of opportunity. The distribution of wealth after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was undemocratic, as people gained economic power by just being at the right place at the right time, which is both undemocratic and unmeritocratic. The ideals of socialism call for the democratisation of the economy and for the community to share property and wealth. However, this was taken to another extreme with Boris Yeltsin, as individuals gained large state monopolies and this was not even based on notions of democracy or merit. Communism did not produce complete equality of outcome either, as manual workers like Karol remained in the lower rungs of society and they did not have opportunities to mobilise upwards. Ironically, the free-for-all capitalism in this case does offer these opportunities.

            This essay will now examine John Rawls’ ideas on equality. John Rawls wrote an influential book called A Theory of Justice (1971), where he tried to reach a reach a compromise between liberty and equality. He starts the book with a hypothetical ‘veil of ignorance,’ a society of amnesiacs who are in need of a political constitution. Rawls comes up with ‘two principles of justice’ for such a society:

1)     Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and this scheme the equal political liberties, and only these liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

2)     Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a) they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all conditions of fair equality of opportunity and b) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least disadvantaged members of the society’ (1971, p. 5-6).

The first principle emphasises liberal rights whilst the second principle emphasises egalitarianism, but Rawls also argued that liberal rights were in themselves a form of social justice (Rawls, p. 197-98) However, number of criticisms have been made about the theory. These criticisms have been made by leftists, other liberals, libertarians, conservatives and communitarians. Some egalitarians believe that the theory underestimates the importance of equality. G. A. Cohen points out that some work is less fulfilling than other work and that people in the lower rungs of society might have to undertake work that is unpleasant and dangerous. Additionally, other leftists believe that people being better off than others results in them having more power. Rawls argues that the ‘difference principle’ is permitted as long as it leads to basic political liberties. However, vast differences in wealth make it impossible for poor people to be elected to political office or to even have their political views represented. Meanwhile, utilitarians argue that the theory does not maximise utility. Libertarians, or ‘classical liberals,’ argue that the theory infringes on property rights. The second principle requires redistributive taxation for the benefit of the poor and theorists like Robert Nozick think that this involves the immoral takings of just holdings. Some go as far as arguing that this taxation is a form of theft. The ‘desert-based principle’ argues that some people deserve their just takings for hard work. These people come to their advantaged position because of their hard work and their position in society is thus fair. Finally, ‘luck egalitarianism’ argues that inequalities are only just when they are derived from the choices that people make and that the individual is responsible for (Lamont and Favor 2017). Finally, the communitarian critique of Rawls argues that ideas of justice and fairness are derived from society rather than the self (Mansfield 1990, p. 18). The veil of ignorance assumes that people are individuals without any social ties. According to a communitarian view, a political constitution should take into account shared values as well as liberal rights (Mansfield, p. 17).

            This essay will now hold these theories in mind whilst analysing scenes in White. Karol ends up with no financial security when he breaks up with his former wife. As such, inequality in this case does not protect the least vulnerable in society. The scene starts with a mid-shot of Karol in front of a cash machine. It is late at night and the street is dark and the sound is recorded on location. The camera tilts down and dollies into a close-up of the cash machine, from a 180 degree angle. The machine says that his money has been confiscated. The film later edits to a scene in a bank and Karol is framed via a low angle shot. The bank clerk says: ‘Your account is frozen. Your account cannot be used, it’s invalidated. […] I can’t give it to you.’ He proceeds to cut the card. We later see a mid-shot, shot on location, of Karol in the streets of Paris, where he is cold and uncomfortable. We later see a low-angle close-up of Karol busking at the metro, where he encounters another Polish individual. We The Polish individual is framed via a low-angle mid-shot; that is, from Karol’s perspective. The man offers to smuggle him back to Poland. The low-angle mid-shots, which sometimes tilt, are often subjective. They often recreate his lowly position, as he is often on the floor begging for money. In these scenes, inequality is not justified from a Rawlsian perspective, as it does not satisfy the needs of the least disadvantaged members of society. Karol has not chosen to end up in his predicament; it happens due to forces beyond his control. He did not choose to divorce, nor to have his card cancelled. The egalitarian critique of Rawls argues that differences in wealth result in a small minority having enormous power over the disenfranchised. Karol is a foreign labourer who ends up homeless and he is represented by politicians or trade unions. Meanwhile, libertarians do not believe that Karol is entitled to a redistributive safety net, as it invades their just holdings, even though Karol is homeless through no fault of his own. Communitarians argue that Rawls sees individuals as atoms who are devoid of social ties. However, Rawls would think that Karol is entitled to rights which are denied to him, such as unemployment insurance. However, Karol does have opportunities to mobilise. Under communism, he remains stranded in the same economic class. The opportunities that he encounters, though, are very sinister. Someone offers to kill him for money and he eventually makes millions through the black market. As such, some opportunities in the capitalistic system are sinister, immoral and criminal.   

            This essay will now examine R. H. Tawney, a British socialist political theorist. Tawney wrote about equality in books such as Equality (1931) and The Acquisitive Society (1920). Tawney argued that poverty was a symptom and consequence of a disorder in social values. Capitalism stressed individual rights without any reference to the function that society plays in forming the individual (Foote 1985, p. 74). Tawney thought that the decline of religion led to an emphasis on rights without any social purpose (p. 24). Capitalism did not serve the community, it was only interested in individual self-interest (p. 75). Under capitalism, people use their skills and energy without any reference to morality. People are used as a means to self-advancement (p. 75). The brotherhood of man and moral principles become irrelevant and people only become interested in material gain (p. 75). Tawney wanted society to be based on duties, obligations, unity and cooperation rather than division and mutual antagonism (p. 75). In his book Equality, Tawney argued that, although the upper classes denounced class struggle, they practised it all the time. As such, they endorsed vast differences in income, security, culture and health (p. 76). Tawney thought that the redistribution of wealth was insufficient; he also wanted society to value our common humanity (p. 76). Economic power was concentrated in one class and Tawney wanted to tackle this by breaking down ‘rigid divisions between labour and management’ (p. 77). Lower income workers were equally entitled to better wages and for their right to organise themselves efficiently. As such, they were equally entitled to have a say in the management process (p. 77). Inequality in health and education led to ill-health, incapacity and high infant mortality. These inequalities were concentrated in working class areas and they were hereditary. Their class background condemned them to overcrowded classrooms, poor facilities, poor housing and poor medical care. Social traditions pampered a few children and deprived the rest (p. 77). Both educational privilege and capitalism segregated people into classes (p. 78). As such, Tawney proposed a free health service, more state control of public education, better equipped schools and better-quality education. A small segment of society enjoyed liberty whilst the majority were restricted to unfreedom (p. 78). Tawney defined freedom as the ability to act positively for the community. Additionally, Tawney argued that freedom for everyone also entails an acceptance of social rules so as to prevent the abuse of power (p. 78).

            Karol’s homelessness can also be analysed from a Tawneyian perspective. Tawney would argue that Karol’s homelessness is a symptom of an uncaring society. Capitalism does not meet the needs of people because it is self-interested and profit-driven. This comes through most strongly in the scene where the clerk cuts up his credit card. He is not interested in the welfare of the customer; he is simply interested in the workings of capitalism and he shows no compunction. Tawney would argue that Karol ends up homeless due to the failings of society, not due to his own fault. Christianity was interested in catering for the welfare of everyone, but the acquisitive society is only concerned with profit and not with meeting the needs of people. Enormous inequalities in wealth and income mean that power and wealth are concentrated in a single class. Workers have no say in the economy, as Karol is not allowed to express himself. Management control the economy and workers like Karol are not allowed to have any say on their desperate situation. Educational privilege also segregates people into classes, as Karol is consigned to his lowly class.

            However, Karol eventually rises from his situation by abusing power. This is contrary to what Tawney wanted, as he wanted liberty to respect social rules. He turns to the black market, swindles his wife, orchestrates his own death, frames his wife and sends her to prison. Although he is initially consigned to unfreedom, he abuses its rules once he acquires liberty of action and economic power. There are scenes in the film which show him framing his own death. This scene starts with a 90 degree mid-shot of Karol’s friend, followed by a 180 degree mid shot of the executor of his will. The editing alternates between these two shots. This is followed with an extreme close-up of Karol’s passport being shredded. A later scene depicts Karol choosing his own grave and Karol later blames his ex-wife for his murder. Earlier on, Karol is not protected from destitution by any safety net. However, he acquires his wealth by abusing the system and he keeps acting in a self-interested way. According to Tawney, a Christian society would prevent him from falling into poverty, but Karol rises from his lowly social class by abusing social rules.

            This essay will now look at the final ideal, fraternity. Fraternity has been defined as the ideal of brotherhood, friendship, community or co-operation (Ashtana 1992, p.118). Fraternity is the view ‘that we are brothers’ and that we are on an equal footing’ (Denman 1995, p. 193). Aristotle initially argued that friendship is an important aspect of both politics and justice (Asthana, p. 118). Indeed, some people argue that politics is a social contract between citizens (p. 118). In the medieval ages, people emphasised the political value of friendship and that we are all the sons of God and, hence, brothers (p. 119). Meanwhile, the French revolution emphasised neither the Aristotelean meaning nor the meaning of the French revolution (p. 119), it was a springboard to political action (p. 119). The majority were exploited, poor and hungry. Hence, everyone had to unite in fraternal friendships so as to overcome class divisions and national boundaries (p. 119). Hegel went as far as seeing the state as the expression of the collective human spirit. Meanwhile, Marx wanted the toiling masses to unite as a fraternal class so as to overcome exploitation (p. 121). Meanwhile, liberals accept communities as long as they are consistent with the autonomy of the individual (p. 123). Above all else, there is a democratic need for fraternity because ‘it provides the context within which equality can be established and freedom can be protected’ (P. 123). In other words, it is a means through which to achieve the ideals of freedom and equality. Additionally, fraternal values are also biologically important. Evolutionary biology rewards altruistic behaviour, as organisms help each other to survive this way. Evolution does not reward selfish behaviour, as it does not lead to reproductive fitness (Okasha 2003).

            The Soviet Union assiduously enforced the ideal of equality, but they also assiduously enforced ideals of fraternity. Indeed, solidarity is a central component of socialism. The Polish philosopher Lesek Kolakowski wrote about ‘enforced fraternity’ in the USSR. Indeed, British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton writes about him in glowing terms. Churchill argued that democracy is the least worst system and Kolakowski argued that the same is true for capitalism (Scruton 2009). Capitalism emerged organically after the spread of commerce. No-one planned it and it did not need an all-embracing ideology. Socialism was an ideological construction, but capitalism was merely human nature at work. Scruton quotes Kolakowski thusly:

Socialism is an attempt to institutionalize and enforce fraternity. It seems obvious by now that a society in which greed is the main motivation of human action, for all of its repugnant and deplorable aspects, is incomparably better than a society based on compulsory brotherhood, whether in national or international socialism (Scruton 2009).

Meanwhile, the democratic socialist Nathan J. Robinson also quotes Kolakowski in his own publication Current Affairs. In this quote, Kolakowski still argues that it is important to preserve the importance of fraternity.

 [It would be] a pity if the collapse of communist socialism resulted in the demise of the socialist tradition as a whole and the triumph of Social Darwinism as the dominant ideology. Fraternity under compulsion is the most malignant idea devised in modern times. This is no reason, however, to scrap the idea of human fraternity. If it is not something that can be effectively achieved by means of social engineering, it is useful as a statement of goals. The socialist idea is dead as a project for an ‘alternative society.’ But as a statement of solidarity with the underdog and the oppressed, as a motivation to oppose Social Darwinism, as a light that keeps before our eyes something higher than competition and greed—for all these reasons, socialism—the ideal, not the system—still has its uses. (Robinson 2018)

Indeed, many European socialist parties talk about the importance of socialism as an ideal rather than as an alternative economic system (Kastning 2013). If fraternity is to be of any importance, it should be realised by autonomous individuals and through voluntary associations. Scruton believes that institutions and human relationships are important, but they should come about organically and through private associations.

            Martha Nussbaum writes about the tension between solitude and fraternity in her book The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986). Nussbaum argues that, although self-sufficiency, solitude and contemplation is enriching and important, it still needs some sort of external stimulation to instigate it (p. 343). Political citizenship, political attachment, personal love and personal friendship are also important values (p. 343). Indeed, Aristotle argues that social, political relations are essential parts of the good life (p. 344). Other hermetical thinkers from antiquity, such as Epicurus and Phyrro, urged contemplative detachment from civic life (p. 345). Aristotle argues that membership of a political community is in itself good for developing character (p. 345). This is because laws, political institutions and public education nurture individual lives (p. 346). Aristotle argued that a public education would create a sense of belonging to the city and the community (p. 347). It requires ‘support from without’ (p. 347). The good life is still dependent on individual choice; slaves cannot choose and are therefore not fully human (p. 348). Although Aristotle values individual choice and autonomy, political life is part of our nature. The Cyclopes in Homer’s Odyssey are not fully human, as they have no social or political life. Aristotle believes that virtue is ‘relational’ and that justice, courage, moderation and generosity are impossible without it (p. 352). By increasing our activity in the world, we make it meet our demands (p. 352). The city, however, is a plurality of free and equal citizens who make their own choices (p. 352). Aristotle defends family bonds, but he also defends personal separateness. Plato wants to eliminate the family and private property, but Aristotle believes that diversity enriches society whereas Plato’s view ‘impoverishes the world’ (p. 353).

              Red is based on the ideal of fraternity. The main character, played by Irene Jacob, meets a reclusive judge. The former judge pries on private telephone conversations. The character initially meets the judge, played by Jean Trignitant, because she runs over his dog. The scene starts with a mid-shot Trignitant and Jacob. This is followed with a low-angle 90 degree mid-shot, with light coming in from outside. Jacob tells Trignitant: ‘Don’t do this anymore.’ Trignitant says: ‘I’ve done it all of my life.’ ‘What were you? A cop’ ‘Worse. A judge.’ The editing alternates between 90 degree close ups of Jacob and Trignitant. A mid-shot of Jacob tilts down as Trignitant leans down. Jacob later says: ‘Everyone deserves a private life.’ The room is filled with many books and this reveals that he is very learned. The camera angles are often framed via mid-shots, which reveal the vastness of the house and how it is festooned with books and other objects. The vastness of the house, and the framing, emphasise how lonely the judge is and how he has cut himself off from fraternal bonds. There is also a small statue of dogs, which reveal his affection for the animal. Trignitant encourages Jacob to confront the family about his illicit activities, but she rescinds because she does not want to break the family apart. This has parallels with Nussbaum’s ideas on justice, as the attempt to act ethically has to take into consideration factors which are outside the control of the individual and which could potentially bring ruin. Jacob also wants the judge to respect the autonomy and personal separateness of the family, but she feels that Trignitant is encroaching on their own autonomy so as to pursue egotistical choices. Jacob would also be trampling on their fraternal bonds, as breaking the family apart would break apart the ties that hold them together.

            However, Irene Jacob and the judge become closer. There is a scene wherey meet at a venue with red seats, red wallpaper and a red podium. We see a mid-shot of Jacob and the judge who are both far away from each other, but they are both pleased to be near each other. We later see a long shot of the theatre and the red seats. There is a mid-shot of Jacob and Trigninant is in the lower right hand corner of the frame. ‘You came. You knew the invitation came from me? ‘I’d hoped so.’ Trignitant later says: ‘I’m leaving tomorrow. I came to say goodbye.’ The camera work later edits to mid-shots from the characters’ perspectives. Trignitant says: ‘You’re the woman I never met.’ The abundance of red obviously emphasises the values of fraternity. Also, the camera work emphasises the distance from each other, but the framing of the bodies via close-ups brings them closer together. Fraternity was championed during the French Revolution because it overcame divisions between classes and people. In this case, both characters overcome their divisions and bonds, even though they are different from each other. Fraternity was also a means towards the ideals of freedom and equality, as common unity created the conditions that could eradicate inequalities in class, wealth, gender, etc. They also overcome their divisions so that they can pursue their own individual freedom. Indeed, fraternity in this case is reached voluntarily. This is line with Nussbaum’s and Aristotle’s views on fraternity, as they wanted a diverse political body to unite of their own volition. It also in line with Kolakowski’s views on fraternity, as they are behaviour has not been enforced. It is done by autonomous individuals, not an arbitrary centrally planned hierarchy. Kolakowksi preferred the most egotistical form of unregulated capitalism to this other sinister outcome.

            The French revolution emerged after a period of extreme inequality and its ideals were delineated by Thomas Paine in The Rights of Man. This essay looked at positive liberty, negative liberty, personal freedom and political freedom. Negative liberty emphasises absence of interference whilst positive liberty aims to interfere and provide resources which strengthen individual freedom. The character in the film, Julie, tries to cut herself off from others, but she still depends on resources and institutions to achieve this. This essay looked at both personal and political freedom. Julie strives after personal freedom, but she later connects to a higher political ideal when she writes a piece of music dedicated to the European Union. This essay examined several aspects of equality, namely the equal worth of individuals, the differences between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, the ideas of John Rawls and the ideas of R. H. Tawney. The Polish character Karol does not believe that he is treated equally at a trial, as he does not speak French. In a democracy, however, laws should be universal and all people should have equal worth. The differences between equality of opportunity and equality in outcome are crucial in White, as the protagonist makes a fortune after the collapse of communism. The communist countries attempted to level incomes completely, but this meant that individuals in the lower rungs rarely mobilised upwards. There is more equality of opportunity in the capitalist west, but Karol makes his fortune by abusing the system. This essay looked at the ideas of John Rawls, who argued that a decent society should let its citizens enjoy basic liberties. He also argued that inequalities should only be permitted if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. Inequalities do not benefit Karol in White, as he has no financial security following his divorce and the safety net does not prevent him from becoming homeless. According to R. H. Tawney, capitalism was based on individual self-interest and it was immoral. According to Tawney’s view, Karol ends up homeless due to the uncaring nature of the capitalist society. Finally, Red deals with fraternity. The character played by Irene Jacob bonds with a character played by Trignitant, although she initially objects to him prying on the conversation of his neighbours. Their fraternal bonding overcomes their divisions and this is how the French Revolution conceived of fraternity. They do this, however, of their own volition, which is in line with the ideas of Aristotle. Aristotle wanted a society that valued common citizenship and friendship, but he still wanted it to be comprised of plurality and individual choice. Similarly, Lesek Kolakowski argued that compulsory fraternity was ‘malignant’ and that he preferred a highly unregulated and immoral society to ‘compulsory fraternity.’ However, he still thought that it was important to value fraternity as long as it respected human agency. This is what happens in Red, as the characters bond of their own volition. These are the aspects of liberty, equality and fraternity that this essay has identified in these three films.

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